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Whom Should I Merge With?  
How product substitutability affects merger profitability 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Merger profitability is investigated by a large body of theoretical literature, starting from the 
seminal contributions by Salant et al. (1983), Deneckere and Davidson (1985), and Perry and 
Porter (1985). A striking result is that merger can be individually unprofitable for merging 
firms, as they reduce their output production, in front of non-merging firm(s) increasing 
output. As shown by subsequent literature, the occurrence of this outcome, known as “the 
merger paradox”, is due to strategic interdependence. The reasons of the paradox are well 
known: two countervailing effects are in operation, when firms decide to merge, in a 
oligopolistic market. On the one side, there is a positive profit effect, due to the elimination of  
rival firm(s); on the other hand, non-merging firms have an incentive to increase production –
if competition is in quantity, and reaction curves are downward sloping. The relative size of 
these two effects drives the final result concerning the merger profitability. A number of 
factors matter, including the initial and final (pre- and post- merger) market shares, the firms’ 
choice variable(s), that is, the price or quantity competition (see McElroy, 1993), the 
competition along one or more dimensions (Pinto and Sibley, 2016; Brekke et al., 2017), the 
cost structure and the cost nature (Farrel and Shapiro, 1990; Fanti and Meccheri, 2012; 
Majumdar, 2019), and the product characteristics (e.g., Hsu and Wang, 1990). A literature 
review is provided by Faulì-Oller and Sandonis (2018). 
What has induced the present investigation is the debate following the proposal of 
merger between FCA and Renault, in Summer 2019. The merger proposal had very short life 
–as both parties, substantially, withdraw the proposal in some days. During those days, 
however, several observers, especially in Italy and France, cast doubts about the profitability 
of such a merger, in front of the fact that these firms supply very similar products in the car 
market (substantially, both FCA and Renault produce “traditional” cars of “medium level”, 
and they are absent from the market segment of innovative electric cars). Some months later, 
the merger between FCA and PSA (Peugeot-Citroen) has successfully occurred. In this case, 
columnists and policy-makers generally expressed positive opinions, also basing on the fact 
that the two groups have different points of strength. These pieces of news lead to ask 
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whether, in a market of differentiated products, a firm finds it more profitable to merge with a 
more similar or more different product supplier.  
Though very huge, the theoretical body of economic literature on mergers overlooks 
this specific point, namely whether mergers are more profitable if they occur between firms 
providing similar or different products. To the best of my knowledge, I can mention only two 
theoretical papers dealing with this point; they reach opposite conclusions. Ebina and Shimizu 
(2009) analyse a framework made by four firms, and merger incentives are shown to be 
stronger for firms producing closely related goods than more differentiated goods. The main 
interest of Ebina and Shimizu (2009) is in the occurrence of sequential mergers, and they also 
show that  either a sequence of mergers occurs, or no mergers occur in equilibrium. Hsu and 
Wang (2010) consider a uniform product substitution rate among varieties, and show  that 
merging emerges to be profitable if varieties are sufficiently distant substitutes: however, that 
paper considers symmetric substitutability across all pairs of goods, and the more distant 
goods are, the more profitable the merger between two firms is. 
In this article, I propose a very simple model specifically focussing on the point of 
merger profitability as related to the degree of differentiation of products. The present model 
differs from Hsu and Wang (2010), as long as substitutability between goods is not 
homogeneous. It differs from Ebina and Shimizu (2009), as it is simpler, more focussed on the 
role of the degree of product differentiation, and does not consider sequential merger. Thus, I 
believe that the economic reason driving the result can emerge more neatly. Roughly 
speaking, the result from the present model is that merging with a more similar product is 
more profitable than merging with the firm supplying more different product variety. Thus, 
the conclusion is more in line with the outcome from Ebina and Shimizu (2009) than Hsu and 
Wang (2010). The intuition rests on the fact that when two firms producing similar goods 
merge, they internalise a strong (negative) externality, which overcomes the negative effect 
deriving from the non-merging firm, which finds it optimal to increase production. On the 
contrary when the merger occurs between firms producing highly differentiated goods, the 
internalised externality is limited, and not able to compensate the negative effect due to the 
increased production of the non-merging firm.  
The present model is very simple indeed: it is focussed on the market structure; it is 
static; it does not take into account product and process innovation; it omits to consider the 
effects of merger upon inputs’ cost; it disregards the multidimensional nature of competition; 
and so on. Nevertheless, it permits to understand pros and cons of merger, for a specific firm, 
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from a market structure perspective. It also permits to draw some insights about static market 
social welfare. The merger paradox may occur, as previous models have documented. In the 
present model we simply show that, under a wide range of sensible parameter configuration, 
the paradox typically occurs when strongly differentiated goods providers do merge; the 
paradox is harder to emerge if merger occurs between similar goods providers. The economic 
reason is simple: when merging firms offer similar products, the negative externality from 
competition (which is internalised after merger) is strong, and it is larger than the competitive 
pressure deriving from the outside (non-merging) firm. On the opposite, if two very different 
firms do merge, they internalise a tiny externality, and the competitive pressure deriving from 
the outside (non-merging) firm prevails.   
Interestingly, from the standpoint of the present model, the merger with Renault should 
have been for FCA more profitable than the merger with a firm offering more different cars, 
such as Peugeot (and vice versa). 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the basics of the model and 
find the outcome of pre-merger configuration. Section 3 and 4 find the outcome when a 
merger occurs between firms supplying “slightly” differentiated varieties, and “strongly” 
differentiated varieties, respectively; comparison of firms’ profit are examined. Section 5 
takes the consumer perspective, and analyses the welfare outcome of different mergers. 
Implications, comments and concluding remarks are gathered in Section 6.  
 
 
2. The basics of the model: a triopoly game 
 
Three firms (1, 2, 3) serve a market, each producing a product variety that is horizontally 
differentiated with respect to the others. Each product variety is supplied by only one firm, so 
that, throughout the paper, “firm”, “product” or variety” can be taken as synonymous. The 
location of firms in the product space is represented by Figure 1: thus, the product variety of 
firm 1 is more similar to the variety of firm 2 than to the variety of firm 3 (and vice versa).1  
Just to give a simple example, borrowed from the car market, let us imagine that firm 1 offers 
traditional cars, firm 2 offers hybrid cars, firm 3 offers electric car.  
                                                          
1
 Notice that, in Figure 1, firm 2 is located in a position  equi-distant to the other two firms, so that 
firm 1 and 3 are symmetric with respect to firm 2. 
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1      2      3 
Figure 1.  Location of varieties in the product space. 
 
The inverse demand function for firm 1 is: 
 
 3211)1( qqqMp δγβ −−−=   
 
where parameter β  captures the responsiveness of the price of the variety to its own produced 
quantity, while  γ  and δ are the cross- responsiveness coefficients; in particular the following 
assumption is made: 
 
0)'1( >>> δγβ  
 
which means that products are substitutes, and the substitutability between the varieties of 
firms 1 and 2 is larger than the substitutability between the varieties of firms 1 and 3. 
For reason of symmetry, consistency and analytical simplicity, inverse demand 
functions for firms 2 and 3 are respectively:  
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Cost functions are assumed to be linear, without fixed cost, and symmetric across firms, 
entailing constant returns to scale for all firms: 
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As first step, we find the Nash equilibrium in this market, provided that each of the three 
firms individually acts as a profit-maximizer Cournot oligopolist. The individual problem 
faced by each of the three firms can write as follows: 
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Let be: .0>−= cMA  From the FOCs one obtains the reaction functions  
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which are negatively sloped with respect to the opponents’ production levels (as expected). 
SOCs are met, as long as all objective functions are concave. Equilibrium production levels 
turn out to be:  
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This outcome is labelled as the ‘decentralised triopoly allocation’. Given the parametric 
restrictions assumed above, all equilibrium quantities are positive. It is also easy to check that 
231 qqq >= . The fact that the production of varieties 1 and 3 are larger than the production 
level of variety 2 can be easily explained by observing that firm 2 faces two “close” substitute 
varieties, while firm 1 and 3 face only one “close” substitute, while the remaining competitor 
offers a more differentiated (less close) good. 
Profit levels, in the decentralised triopoly equilibrium, are: 
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The following clear-cut sequence holds: *2
*
3
*
1 πππ >= , so that one can conclude that the firm 
facing a larger number of close substitutes obtains smaller profit as compared to firms facing a 
lower number of close substitutes. This is intuitive and fully in line with the results of 
differentiated oligopoly literature (Spence, 1979). 
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3. Merging of firms producing slightly differentiated goods 
Let us consider the case in which firm 1 and 2 do merge, and they aim to maximize the joint 
profit. We assume that the merger does not modify the number and nature of available 
varieties, nor cost functions. So, there are no economies of scope or economies of scale 
generated by the merger. These assumptions serve to rule out obvious price decreasing forces 
on the cost side. In other words, in the present model, merger has a pure market structure 
effect. Objective functions become: 
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Notice that a unified decision maker sets jointly q1 and q2, while firm 3 is acts as outside (not 
merging) firm. From the FOCs: ,0/)( 121 =∂+∂ qππ  ,0/)( 221 =∂+∂ qππ and 0/ 33 =∂∂ qπ , 
one finds the reaction functions and hence the equilibrium levels of production; the 
equilibrium allocation of this setting is labelled by using the superscript M1&2 (which clearly 
stays for ‘merging  firm 1 and 2’): 
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The following parametric restriction is necessary and sufficient to avoid corner solutions:  
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This amounts to require that a sufficiently large degree of differentiation exists, even within 
the pair of more similar goods.2  
Provided that individual production levels are positive, it is easy to check that: 
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(See Appendix 1 for proof). Verbally, as far as the merging firms are concerned, the firm that 
was larger before the merger, continues to produce a larger amount of good after merging; the 
smaller merging firm unambiguously produces a lower amount of good after merging as 
compared to its pre-merger production; the larger merging firm could produce a larger or 
smaller output level, as compared to the pre-merger output level, depending on parameter 
configuration; however, a contraction of aggregate production of merged firms does emerge as 
a consequence of the merger. As far as the non-merging (outside) firm, its equilibrium 
production level increases, after the opponents’ merger. The outcome is in line with the main 
message of the theoretical literature on mergers: merging firms tend to decrease the joint 
production, and this drives non-merging firms to increase their production. The outcome is the 
reason of the so called ‘merging paradox’, according to which mergers could entail lower 
profit for merging firms and larger profit for non-merging firms. This could be the case also in 
the present framework, conditional on specific parameter configuration.   
Indeed, by simple substitutions it is easy to obtain the maximum profit level for each firm, 
under the equilibrium emerging after the merger between firms 1 and 2: 
                                                          
2
 Limiting our attention to the parameter space where βγδ <<<0 , it can be analytically proved that the 
numerator of (8’) is strictly positive, as long as 2/)( δγβ +> , while the denominator is positive if 
)25/()4(0 22 δβδββγ −−<< . The numerator of (8’’) is positive if  
)26/()4(0 22 δβδβγ −−<< . The numerator of (8’’’) is positive as long as βγ <<0 . Hence, 
condition (9) follows. 
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One can show that: 
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The non-merging firm benefits from the merger between merging firms, as usual in this kind 
of models. The larger merging firm (firm 1), in this case, obtains a gain from the merger, 
while the smaller merging firm (firm 2) may obtain a gain or a loss from the merger, 
depending on parameter configuration. The joint profits of firms 1 and 2 after the merger is in 
any case larger than the sum of individual profits before the merger. (See Appendix 2 for 
details; Appendix 2 also provides the outcome of numerical simulation, to identify the 
parameter space where the merger paradox occurs).  
 
 
4. The merger of firms producing highly differentiated goods 
Let us consider what outcome derives from the merger between firm 1 and firm 3, whose 
goods are more differentiated as compared to the pair of goods produced by firm 1 and 2. 
Repeating the steps of the procedure adopted in the previous case, we consider the problem 
faced by the firms in this setting, where firms 1 and 3 act as a unified decision-maker: 
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From the FOCs: ,0/)(/)( 331131 =∂+∂=∂+∂ qq ππππ  and ,0/ 22 =∂∂ qπ one finds the 
reaction functions and hence the equilibrium levels of production; the equilibrium allocation 
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of this setting is labelled by using the superscript M1&3 (which stays for ‘merging  firm 1 and 
3’): 
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Given our starting symmetry assumptions, the merging firms share here the same individual 
production level, after the merger; moreover, in this case, no further parametric restrictions are 
required. It is easy to prove analytically that the individual production of the merging firms 
drops, following the merger, while the production level of the outside firm increases. 
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Simple substitutions lead to find the maximum profit levels: 
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One can show (See Appendix 3): 
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Thus, the merger between firms 1 and 3, can be profitable or not for the merging firms, 
depending on parameter configuration. In particular, numerical simulations (See Appendix 3) 
reveal that the merger is profitable for the merging firms if the difference δγ −  is limited: 
this means that the goods produced by firms 2 and 3 are pretty similar. Otherwise, the merger 
paradox does emerge, and the merging firms experience lower individual profit after the 
merger, as compared to the pre-merger equilibrium. 
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Differently, the non-merging firm unambiguously benefits from the merger, as usual in this 
kind of models (also in this case, the result is obtained through numerical simulations, as the 
analytical expression is too cumbersome to draw algebraic conclusions).  
 
 
5. Whom does a firm find it profitable to merge with? 
We here compare the profit of firm 1, after the merger with firm 2 or with firm 3, 
alternatively. The outcome is the core message of the present theoretical investigation. 
Unambiguously, the merger with the more similar firm is more profitable than the merger 
with the firm producing the more differentiated good. 
Indeed, 3&11
2&1
1
MM ππ −  emerges to be always positive, in the economically meaningful 
parameter space (see Appendix 4). Of course, the difference is nil in the limiting case in 
which γδ = : under this circumstance, the goods produced by firms 2 and 3 are homogeneous, 
so that it is equivalent, for firm 1, the merger with firm 2 or firm3. 
We provide an economic intuition for the clear-cut result, proving that –under our 
assumptions– it is more profitable for a firm to merge with the firm producing the more 
similar good, as compared to firm producing the more differentiated good. Indeed, merger 
between firms drives the merging firms to internalise the (reciprocal) negative external effect. 
This internalization entails “positive gains” for merging firms. On the other hand, the merged 
firm faces the competition from the non-merging firm, which usually sets a larger amount of 
production, as a reply to the output reduction by part of the merging firms. The strategic 
reaction of the outside (non-merging) firm is the source of the negative effect of merger upon 
the merging firm (and it is the source of the “merger paradox”). If the merger occurs between 
similar firm, the “negative reciprocal externality” that they internalise is strong. The less 
similar are the goods produced by the merging firms, the less strong the externality to 
internalize through merger. So, it is far from being surprising that the merger between firms 
producing more similar goods is more beneficial for the merging firms as compared to the 
merger between firms producing highly differentiated goods. 
It is worth stressing, once again, that among our assumptions, we do not consider variation in 
production technology due to the merger, nor variation in the characteristics of products. In 
other words, we are overlooking the R&D and the innovation part of merger agreement, and 
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we only consider the forces acting through the output market mark-up and the strategic 
interaction, conditional on given technology, cost structure, and product substitutability.   
 
 
6. Conclusions 
We have presented a very simple analytical model to deal with a simple question: in a market 
of differentiated products, is it more profitable, for a firm, to merge with a firm providing a 
similar good, or a highly differentiated good? Focussing on the incentives at the output market 
level, the present model provides a clear-cut answer: higher profitability is associated to the 
merger with the firm supplying the more similar good. The reason clearly rests on the fact 
that, in this case, the internalised externality through merger is larger.   
The theoretical conclusion, though straightforward, can have some interest in ongoing debates 
concerning mergers. For instance, this investigation has been stimulated by a number of 
columns, especially in Italian, French and US newspapers, casting doubts about the fact that a 
merger between FCA and Renault could be profitable for these firms, provided that they 
produce quite similar cars. According to some columnists, a merger for each of these firms 
would be more profitable with a different firm, producing more differentiated goods (for 
instance, with companies which have a larger know-how in electric or hybrid motorcars). This 
is the case of the merger between FCA and Peugeot, which has successfully occurred some 
months later indeed, in the presence of  a largely positive feeling of columnists and policy-
makers. From a theoretical perspective, the argument of the present paper leads to the opposite 
conclusion: when firms produce more similar good, the externality which is internalised by 
the merger is larger, and hence the gain from merger is larger. Of course, the present simple 
model has overlooked considerations about innovation of product and process, and the 
different incentives for innovation efforts deriving from merger. It could be true that 
considerations related to incentive for product and process innovation, and a proper dynamic 
model, leads to reversed conclusion. However, from a static point of view, market choices 
related to optimal production level and mark-up in the presence of strategic interdependence 
clearly suggests that merger with more similar competitors is better for merging firms. 
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APPENDIXES 
 
Appendix 1. Comparison of pre-merger and post-merger production levels: merger 
between firm 1 and 2  
 
As to the difference: 
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its sign is unambiguously positive, as both the numerator and the denominator are positive, under the 
assumptions at hand. 
As to the difference:  
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while it is unclearly signed from an analytical point of view, all numerical simulations (fixing 1=β ) 
show that the difference is negative in the relevant parameter range.  
As to the difference: 
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which is unclearly signed from an analytical point of view, numerical simulations show that it is 
usually negative, apart from the case where parameter γ  is above a threshold level, which means that 
the differentiation between 1 and 2 is somewhat limited. The threshold level (for 1=β ) is 
( ) 2/172)3( 2 +−+−= δδδγ  For instance, if  2.0=δ , the post-merger level of production of 
firm 1 is smaller than the pre-merger level for 639.02.0 << γ , while it is larger for 
733.0639.0 << γ . 
Since the reaction function of firm 3 is negatively sloped with respect to opponents’ production 
levels, we expect that its production level increases, if q1 decreases, while the outcome could be 
ambiguous in the parameter space where q1 increases.  In fact, numerical simulations show that firm 
3’s production level unambiguously increases as a consequence of the merger between of firm 1 and 
2. QED. 
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Appendix 2. Comparison of pre-merger and post-merger profits: merger between firm 1 
and 2  
 
As to the difference: *1
2&1
1 ππ −M ,  its signs is unclear form an analytical point of view. However,  
note that A has a pure scale effect. Fixing A=10 and 1=β , one can numerically check that the 
differential is positive in the whole sensible parameter space concerning γ  and δ . 
As to the difference: *2
2&1
2 ππ −M ,  its signs is unclear form an analytical point of view; A has a pure 
scale effect. Fixing  1=β , numerical simulation prove that this difference can be positive or 
negative, depending on combination of (admissible) parameter γ  and δ . For instance, Figure 2 
reports the plot of the difference as a function of γ , having set 2.0=δ . (Remember that, in this case, 
it makes sense to evaluate the outcome for  733.02.0 << γ ); the difference is positive for 
355.02.0 << γ , while it is negative for larger values.  
As to the difference )()( *2*12&112&11 ππππ +−+ MM , numerical simulations show that it 
is always positive in the relevant parameter space. It is interesting to report note that the 
difference is monotonically increasing in γ  (for given values of all other parameters) and 
monotonically decreasing in δ , for given values of all other parameters. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. - Pattern of *2
2&1
2 ππ −M  as a function of γ  , having set: A=10, 1=β , 2.0=δ . Outcome is 
economically meaningful for 733.02.0 << γ . 
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Appendix 3. Comparison of pre-merger and post-merger profits: merger between firm 1 
and 3  
 
The difference *3&1 i
M
i ππ − , i=1,3, that is, the profit differential post vs pre- merger profit of each 
merging firm is analytically cumbersome; however, numerical simulations show that it can be positive 
or negative, depending on parameter configuration., and more specifically the difference is positive if 
the difference δγ −  is limited, while it is negative if the distance between δ   and γ  is large enough. 
For instance, let A=10, 1=β . Moreover, if 5.0=γ , the pattern of  *3&1 iMi ππ −  is reported by 
Figure 3.a, which shows that the differential is positive for 5.0457.0 =<< γδ . Alternatively, 
Figure 3.b reports the pattern of the difference *3&1 i
M
i ππ − as a function of γ  under the parameter 
configuration A=10, 1=β  and 2.0=δ ; clearly, the difference is positive  if 323.02.0 <<= γδ , 
while it is negative for larger values of γ . So, verbally, the merger between 1 and 3 is profitable for 
the merging firms, if the goods produced by firms 2 and 3 are pretty similar, that is, the parameter 
capturing the degree of differentiation of good 1 with respect to good 2 (γ ) and good 3 (δ ) are “not 
too different”. 
Numerical simulations concerning the difference *2
3&1
2 ππ −M are not reported for the sake of 
brevity; they unambiguously show that the difference is positive, for any economically meaningful 
parameter configuration (normalizing A=10, 1=β ). 
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Figure 3.a Pattern of ),( *3&1 iMi ππ − i=1,3 as a function of δ , having set: A=10, 1=β , 5.0=γ . 
Outcome is economically meaningful for 5.00 =<< γδ . 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.b Pattern of *3&1 i
M
i ππ −  as a function of γ  , having set: A=10, 1=β , 2.0=δ . Outcome 
is economically meaningful for 733.02.0 << γ . 
 
 
 
Appendix 4. Comparison of firm 1’s payoff, in case of merger with firm 2 or firm 3, 
alternatively.  
The difference 3&11
2&1
1
MM ππ −  can not be analytically signed. For this reason, we resort to numerical 
simulation. Having normalised A=10 and 1=β , three-dimensional graphs  show positive values for 
the difference at hand, for any possible economically meaningful combination of γδ , . More clearly, 
we report two two-dimension graphs, having added, respectively a numerical value concerning γ  and 
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a numerical value concerning δ , alternatively. Under A=10, 1=β , and having set 5.0=γ , then the 
difference  3&11
2&1
1
MM ππ −  as a function of δ (with 5.00 =<< γδ ) turns out to be always positive 
and monotonically decreasing in δ , over the economically relevant parameter space (See figure 4.a); 
obviously,  the difference is zero in the limiting case  γδ = , for the reason that the products of firms 
2 and 3 are homogeneous in this case, so that it makes no difference for firm 1 to merge with firm 2 or 
3. Similarly, under A=10, 1=β , 2.0=δ  the difference is always positive and increasing in γ  
(figure 4.b) over the whole relevant parametrical space (remember that, in this case, the parameter 
space is economically meaningful for 733.02.0 << γ ). Also in this case, the difference is zero in 
the limiting case in which γδ == 2.0 , that corresponds to the case of homogeneous productions of 
firms 2 and 3. Thus, the more differentiated are the goods of firms 2 and 3, the more profitable is for 
firm1 to merge with the closer firm, as compared to the merger with the firm providing the more 
differentiated good. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.a  Pattern of 3&11
2&1
1
MM ππ − as a function of δ , having set: A=10, 1=β , 5.0=γ . Outcome is 
economically meaningful for 5.00 =<< γδ . 
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Figure 4.b. Pattern of 3&11
2&1
1
MM ππ − as a function of γ , having set: A=10, 1=β , 2.0=δ . Outcome 
is economically meaningful for 733.02.0 << γ . 
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